AegisRE ingests compiled UAV, UGV and USV firmware binaries, runs reproducible analysis pipelines, and produces evidence reports identifying whether a binary has been tampered with — and what the modification likely intends.
Three events — sixteen years apart — share one root cause: compiled binaries running in systems where lives depend on them, with no standard way to check their integrity.
PLC firmware was surgically modified to cause physical destruction while reporting normal values to every monitoring layer. The change was discoverable by comparing against the certified baseline from the moment of deployment — but no tool existed to perform that comparison systematically.
discoverable by binary comparison · undetectedECU firmware detected EPA test cycles and switched to compliant calibration maps. Regulators had the binary but no tooling to analyse it. Nobody compared the certified binary against field-extracted firmware. The fraud ran for seven years.
7 years undetected · regulators held the evidenceResearchers found 16 firmware vulnerabilities in a major drone manufacturer — serial-number forgery, geofence bypass for restricted airspace, and covert telemetry sent to the manufacturer without operator knowledge. The vendor was later added to the US FCC Covered List. Binary analysis could have surfaced the undocumented paths before deployment.
16 vulnerabilities · covert telemetryA deterministic pipeline turns a compiled firmware image into a structured report with full provenance — tool versions, timestamps, and artifact hashes attached to every claim.
Compiled firmware is hashed and registered. Baselines are recorded at certification time.
Field-extracted binaries are diffed against the registered baseline. Every change is detected and localised.
Multi-stage analysis surfaces meaningful changes and anomalies, each stage isolated from the rest.
A structured evidence report separates observed facts from inference — written for procurement, legal, and regulators.